

## AccuVote TSX with GEMS

### **December 22, 2005 Report (version 4.6.4, GEMS version 1.18.24)**

#### Conditions:

- No component of this System shall be connected to any modem or network interface, including the Internet, at any time, except when a standalone local area network configuration in which all connected devices are certified voting system components is used. Transmission of unofficial results can be accomplished by writing results to media, and moving the media to a different computer that may be connected to a network.
- The Diebold System was not shown with a VVPAT. Therefore, all TSX machines sold in the Commonwealth must either have the VVPAT disabled or removed.

#### Recommendations:

The Secretary recommends that subsequent versions of the Diebold System, submitted for certification in Pennsylvania, meet the following conditions:

- All reports produced from the internal ballot images by different system components should display candidate names, party affiliations and all other essential ballot information identically.
- Locks on voting machines and scanners, particularly the Model D, should be keyed differently. At present, a very small number of master keys can open any Diebold unit in the county, which is a security risk.
- GEMS should produce a combined summary report showing names of write-in candidates receiving votes, along with vote totals for all other candidates.

### **January 17, 2006 Report (version 4.6.6, GEMS version 1.18.25)**

#### Conditions:

- Any Pennsylvania county board of elections employing TSX shall not permit the substitution of memory cards after pre-election testing. This involves careful handling and storage procedures and the use of effective seals.
- No component of this System shall be connected to any modem or network interface, including the Internet, at any time, except when a standalone local area network configuration in which all connected devices are certified voting system components is used. Transmission of unofficial results can be accomplished by writing results to media, and moving the media to a different computer that may be connected to a network.
- The Diebold System was not shown with a VVPAT. Therefore, all TSX machines sold in the Commonwealth must either have the VVPAT disabled or removed.

#### Recommendations:

Subsequent versions of the Diebold System are recommended to meet the following conditions:

- Future version of TSX should be modified and incorporated so that the zero report cannot be altered through manipulation of .abo files.
- All reports produced from the internal ballot images by different system components should display candidate names, party affiliations and all other essential ballot information identically.
- Locks on voting machines and scanners, particularly the Model D, should be keyed differently. At present, a very small number of master keys can open any Diebold unit in the country, which is a security risk.
- GEMS should produce a combined summary report showing names of write-in candidates receiving votes, along with vote totals for all other candidates.